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IN THE WAKE OF COAST FEDERAL: THE PLAIN MEANING
RULE AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RHETORICAL ETHIC
KEMIT A. MAWAKANA
INTRODUCTION
"No where other than in [Caucasian] culture[s] do
words mean so little as indices of belief [and
practices]."
- Dr. Marimba Ani
The recent Federal Circuit decision of Coast Federal Bank,
FSB v. United States ("Coast Federal")' portends a revival of the Plain
Meaning Rule ("PMR") in government contract litigation and a
concomitant curtailing of reliance upon extrinsic evidence. In an ever
diversifying America and increasingly global economy, this
dependence is likely to lead to increased unjust results in future
contractual litigation due, in significant part, to the Euro-American
cultural trait of the Rhetorical Ethic ("RE"). 2
Contract interpretation disputes constitute a significant portion
of all government contract litigation,3 and the PMR is one of the key
tools available to courts to resolve such disputes. Since inception of
the PMR, a tension has existed in contract interpretation cases between
strict adherence to the "four-corners" of the contract and allowance of
extrinsic evidence to establish contractual meaning. Coast Federal
represents the inevitable and latest shift back into favor of the PMR in
the field of government contracts. This shift is concurrent with the
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1. 323 F.3d 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
2. As discussed in detail below at page 2, the rhetorical ethic is an anthropological
concept that has been identified as a key tenant of Euro-American culture. The rhetorical ethic
concept captures, inter alia, the dynamic between thought, deed, belief and hypocrisy in Euro-
American culture and societies. MARIMBA ANI, YURUGU: AN AFRICAN-CENTERED CRITIQUE
OF EUROPEAN CULTURAL THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOR 312-13, 315 (1994).
3. "Contract interpretation is probably 'the most frequently litigated issue in
Government contracting."' W. Stanfield Johnson, Interpreting Government Contracts: Plain
Meaning Precludes Extrinsic Evidence and Controls at the Federal Circuit, 34 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 635, 636 (2005) (citing Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Interpretation Disputes: Finding
an Ambiguity, 4 NASH & CIBINIc REP. 25, Apr. 1990, at 58).
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PMR's return into favor with courts interpreting private sector
contracts as well.4
This article engages in an interdisciplinary exploration of the
relationship between the PMR and the RE, and argues for the
expanded usage of extrinsic evidence-not the restriction of it that the
PMR mandates-in contract interpretation. Numerous commentators
have analyzed and argued for and against the PMR;5 none have
explored the crucial link between the PMR and Euro-American
cultural trait of the RE. As discussed below, the relationship of the RE
to the PMR makes the PMR inherently flawed in Euro-American
societies. Further, extrinsic evidence provides the better tool for
deciding contract interpretation issues as it elucidates and bridges the
gap between what was written (or said) by the parties and what was
actually meant by the parties.6
First, this article provides background on the Euro-American
RE cultural trait. Next, it briefly discusses the history of the PMR,
including the Federal Circuit's decision in Coast Federal. Finally, it
explores the relationship of the PMR and the RE, and the implications
for Anglo-American contract law.
I. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RHETORICAL ETHIC
Dr. Marimba Ani, in her groundbreaking and highly-acclaimed
anthropological work, Yurugu: an African-Centered Critique of
European Cultural Thought and Behavior, identifies and introduces
the concept of the RE: "[w]ithin the nature of European culture there
exists a statement of value or of 'moral' behavior that has no meaning
for the members of that culture. I call this the 'rhetorical ethic'; it is of
great imortance for the understanding of the dynamics of the
culture.
The RE "[assists Euro-American] culture in the achievement
and maintenance of power [-] [w]ithout this interpretation certain
manifestations within the verbal [and written] iconography of the
culture appear to be inconsistent with its underlying ideological
4. See generally, George Hyman Constr. Co. v. United States, 832 F.2d 574 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
5. See, e.g., Carlton J. Snow, Contract Interpretation: The Plain Meaning Rule in
Labor Arbitration, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 681, 705 (1987); Johnson, supra note 3, at 639;
Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 1717, 1745 (1995).
6. ANI, supra note 2, at 315.
7. Id. at 312.
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thrust."8 Essentially, the RE helps to explain and demystify how
European people and culture have been able to effectively spread
around the globe projecting statements of peace, goodwill and
civilization to other peoples, while actually engaging in war,
destruction, theft and colonization towards other peoples.
According to Dr. Ani, traditional anthropology is inadequate
and misleading because it draws a distinction between ideal culture
and actual behavior, and posits that this gap is universal to all
cultures.9 The RE, however, is not merely a gav between ideal and
actual, and it is a mistake to link it to the ideal. 0 The RE has to do
with how Euro-Americans "want to appear to others, most often to
non-European peoples-their 'objects' because this appearance works
to his advantage." ' The superficial nature of the RE distinguishes it
from any attempts at universalizing the RE and from merely
dismissing it as a gap from the ideal:
[the] 'rhetorical ethic' is not a 'deep-lying assumption'
[i]t is superficial verbal [or written] expression that is
not intended for assimilation by the members of the
culture that produced it . . . [a]nthropologists talk about
the gap in all cultures between thought and deed,
between ideas and actions. The gap to which I am
referring, however, is between verbal [and written]
expression and belief or commitment; between what
people say and what they do. Nowhere other than in
European culture do words mean so little as indices of
belief 12
By way of example, Dr. Ani offers that, "[it is a] long
cherished [notion] in America that all doctors are selfless, friendly
people who chose medicine as their profession because they felt
themselves 'called' to serve humanity, and who have little interest in
either the money or the prestige of their position."' 3 Despite many
physicians' inability to maintain this view, it persists. This
unrealistically maintained image of altruism is an indicator of the fact
that "this is how Americans want to appear to others, most often to
8. Id at 313.
9. Id
10. Id. at 313-14.
11. Id. at 313.
12. ANI, supra note 2, at 315 (emphasis added).
13. Id at 313.
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non-European peoples-their 'objects' . . . In this case it is the way that
the doctor wants to appear to his patients, or 'objects,' because this
appearance works to his advantage,"' 4  making him appear
compassionate and altruistic.
The United States Declaration of Independence contains the
phrase "all men are created equal[.]" 5 Yet, the Anglo-American
drafters of the document neither believed nor acted consistently with
their written statement, as they stole, raped, exploited, enslaved and
oppressed numerous men, women and children at levels previously
unheard of to humanity.16 The statement "all men are created equal"
was meant for consumption by 'others,' non-Europeans, and acted to
create a favorable impression of the drafters to the 'others,' and to set
up the 'others' for the machinations of the drafters.
The court system in America is generally divided into federal
and state courts, ostensibly to administer justice. Yet, at every state or
federal courthouse on a typical workday, the criminal defendants are
overwhelmingly from the extremely poor, working poor, lower and
lower-middle economic classes.' 7 Seemingly, the middle-class, upper
middle-class, wealthy, and super-rich economic classes are excluded
from being criminal defendants, and simply being in the lower
economic classes is criminal. This is hardly just or fair. Nevertheless,
society advances the message that courts administer justice and are fair
and impartial, working to the advantage of, inter alia, the judges who
are themselves members of the upper classes.' 8
14. Id.; See, e.g., HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID (2006); ALLEN M.
HORNBLUM, ACRES OF SKIN (1998), Vanessa Northington Gamble, MD, PhD, Under the
Shadow of Tuskegee: African Americans and Health Care 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1773
(1997).
15. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
16. See generally, I ELIZABETH DONNAN, DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE SLAVE
TRADE TO AMERICA (1930); and 2 ELIZABETH DONNAN, DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE
SLAVE TRADE TO AMERICA (1930) (providing a comprehensive and detailed exploration of the
enslavement of African people and their transportation across the Atlantic ocean); MALCOLM
X, MALCOLM X ON AFRO-AMERICAN HISTORY (1970) (discussing the enslavement process of
Africans); KOBi K.K. KAMBON, AFRICAN/BLACK PSYCHOLOGY IN THE AMERICAN CONTEXT: AN
AFRICAN CENTERED APPROACH 29-64 (Nubian Nation Publications 1998) (providing historical
overview and context of Europeans relationships to Africans and Native Americans).
17. See, e.g., Tracey L. Mears, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 669, 671
(1998).
18. According to the 2009 U.S. Census report, the real median American household
income was $49,777, compared to the 2009 salary of Federal Circuit Court Judges of
$184,500 annually. Carmen DeNavas-Walt ET AL., Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance
Coverage in the United States: 2009, September 2010, available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/income.html (Last visited April 23, 2011). United
States Courts, Salaries of Federal Judges, Associate Justices and Chief Justice since 1968,
2010, available at
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In Euro-American societies, there is a business field called
marketing that rests on the RE. Misrepresentation is considered
"normal" and expected, as companies propagate statements (video,
audio, and tactile) designed to deceive. For example, a company that
goes by the name BP markets itself as "Beyond Petroleum" when their
major business and primary activity is acquiring, extracting and
refining-oil and natural gas.19 Contrary to being "beyond" petroleum,
the company actually is covered in petroleum, and seeks activities to
remain that way, as opposed to moving into other alternative
energies.20 Marketing itself as "Beyond Petroleum" works to the
company's advantage with respect to the "other" which, in this case, is
the general public.
The socialization process in Euro-American societies fosters
the RE:
[Euro-American societies are] constructed in such a
way that successful survival within it discourages
honesty and directness and encourages dishonesty and
deceit-the ability to appear to be something other than
what one is; to hide one's [intent and] motives ...
Hypocrisy in this way becomes not a negative ... not
immoral or abnormal behavior, but it is both expected
and cultivated. It is considered to be a crucial ingredient
of 'sophistication,' a European goal.21
Other indicia of this feature of the culture are imbedded in the
language and are sometimes substituted for sophistication, words and
phrases like: "savvy," "professional," "knows how to play the game,"
"polished," etc.22
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/JudicialSalarieschart.pdf (Last
visited April 23, 2011).]
19. What BP does, BRITISH PETROLEUM,
http://www.bp.com/extendedsectiongenericarticle.do?categoryld=5& contentld=7044157 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2011).
20. In 2009, BP only invested six percent of the overall investments into alternative
energy. Dana Ford, BP to Invest $1 Billion in Alternative Energy This Year, REUTERS, (Apr.
13, 2010, 7:11 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/13/bp-altenergy-
idUSNI310080220100413.
21. ANi, supra note 2, at 316.
22. Further, terms and phrases in the English language are ripe with examples of the RE
at play in the culture as Euro-Americans refer to people that make statements or believe things
at face value as "country bumpkins," "suckers," "and foolish[.]" Id. This is in contrast to
people who do not tie their beliefs to their statements or their actions to their words and who
thusly are favorably thought of as "sophisticated," "worldly," "polished," or "politically-
savvy[.]"Id.
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The RE's primary role in the success of Europeans and its
consequences to the majority of peoples around the world should not
be underestimated; it even functions when the intentions of Europeans
are to help:
[the RE] is an inherent [and ubiquitous] characteristic
of [Euro-American] culture that prepares members of
the culture to be able to act like friends toward those
they regard as enemies; to be able to convince others
that they have come to help when they, in fact, have
come to destroy the others and their culture. That some
may 'believe' that they are actually doing good only
makes them more dangerous, for they have swallowed
their own rhetoric-perhaps a convenient self-delusion. 23
Thus, as discussed below, this Euro-American cultural feature,
the RE, has significant implications with respect to considering a
party's intent; and, therefore, the PMR.24
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PLAIN MEANING RULE
What would your words mean in the mouth of a "normal"
English speaker? The PMR disregards your intent by asking this very
question. In evaluating the terms of a contract, the PMR desires a
formal and judicial approach to interpretation. 25 The judicial belief is
that "words are symbols with fixed meanings, and parties to a writing
should be held to that meaning, regardless of whether it coincides with
their intention." 26 Courts have wrestled with the PMR for several
centuries, yet there is still no specific method or circumstance to
determine when courts will use PMR.
The PMR states that "if a writing, or the term in question,
appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be
determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to
23. Id. at 315.
24. The RE's implications regarding one's intent are crucial for other central
components of Anglo-American contract law (like the concept of a meeting of the minds) and
for other areas of Anglo-American law including, but not limited to, Constitutional, Criminal
and Civil Rights law. In future writings, I plan to continue to explore the RE's implications
relating to Anglo-American contract law. It is my hope that other scholars begin to examine
the RE's implications in other areas of Anglo-American law.
25. Snow, supra note 5, at 685.
26. Id
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extrinsic evidence of any kind." 27 Therefore, in interpreting contracts
according to the PMR, courts must give words their plain, ordinary,
and literal meaning. If the words are clear, they must be applied, even
though the intention of the parties may have been different or the result
is harsh and undesirable. 28
The PMR continues to survive in some jurisdictions, despite
being rejected by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Uniform
Commercial Code, and several courts. 29 Those jurisdictions that follow
the rule are divided over whether "extrinsic evidence is admissible to
show that a term of the written agreement is ambiguous."30 This means
that, "application of the plain meaning rule requires the preliminary
step of characterizing contractual language as either plain or
ambiguous." 31 Since there are no guidelines for this determination,
courts encounter difficulty deciding whether the written agreement is
plain or ambiguous. 32
In a plain meaning jurisdiction, if the questionable term "is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it contains an
ambiguity." 33 An ambiguity is not established by the mere existence of
a disagreement between the parties, and once an ambiguity is
identified, a court must decide what extrinsic evidence is admissible to
clarify the ambiguity.34
The PMR was originally used as a method of interpreting
government legislation and statutes.35 An explanation of the rule was
27. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3.10 (4th ed.
1998).
28. McAbee Constr. Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
29. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 27, at 148-49 (noting several cases that continue
to use the PMR including Lion Oil Co. v. Tosco Corp., 90 F.3d 268 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying
Arkansas law); Lambert v. Berkley South Condo. Assn., 380 So.2d 588 (Fla. App. 1996);
Dawson v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 197 W.Va. 10, 475 S.E.2d 10 (1996)). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-202 (2010).
30. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 27, at 149.
31. Snow, supra note 5, at 685.
32. Id.
33. JOHN CIBINIC, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 227 (4th ed.
2006) (citing Hills Materials Co. v. Rice, 982 F.2d 514, 516 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); see also id. at
169 (citing Alaska Lumber & Pulp Co. v. Madigan, 2 F.3d 389, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
34. Id. at 227. Indeed, "[r]eliance on this kind of [extrinsic] evidence is necessary to
ensure that the interpretation is based on a knowledge of all the facts and circumstances that
could have a bearing on the parties' intent." Id. at 183. Further, "[t]he general rule is that
extrinsic evidence will not be received to change the terms of a contract that is clear on its
face." Id.; accord McAbee Constr., Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1434-45 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Fluor Daniel, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., EBCA No. C-9909296, 02-2 BCA
(CCH) 32,017 at 158, 202 (2002).
35. See 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1038, 1057 (1844).
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first seen in the British case Sussex Peerage, which held "if the words
of the Statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no
more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural
and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such a case,
best declare the intention of the law giver." 36 The United States
Supreme Court first addressed the PMR in 1917 when it held that
courts must enforce a statute where the language is plain and does not
lead to absurd results. 37
The PMR in contracts has gone through periods of favor and
disfavor over the last two hundred years. The earliest cases dealing
with contract ambiguity referred ambiguous terms to the jury, where
the jury decided the meaning by considering extrinsic evidence such as
custom and trade. 38 However, where there was no ambiguity, the judge
decided the meaning of contract terms. 39
In the early to mid 1900s, equity was a prevalent theme in
resolving contract disputes:
Where the language of a contract is contradictory .. . or
where the meaning is doubtful, so that the contract is
fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which
makes it fair, customary, and such as prudent men
would naturally execute, while the other makes it
inequitable, unusual, or such as reasonable men would
not be likely to enter into, the interpretation which
makes it a rational and probable agreement must be
preferred to that which makes it an unusual, unfair, or
improbable contract." 40
36. Id. at 1057.
37. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 471 (1917) (holding that where the
language of the statute is "plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable
consequences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent").
38. See Eaton v. Smith, 37 Mass. 150, 154, 156 (1838) (stating that an ambiguous word
"in common language, susceptible of two meanings, should have been left to the jury to
determine by the aid of the extrinsic circumstances, which sense was intended by the parties");
see also Worcester Medical Institution v. Harding, 65 Mass. 285, 287-89 (1853); Prather v.
Ross, 17 Ind. 495, 499 (1861) (stating that ambiguous language, "and used in different senses,
or general words in particular trades and branches of business may be used in a new, peculiar
or technical sense, and therefore.. .evidence may be received from those who are conversant
with such branch of business, and such technical or peculiar use of language, to explain.. it").
39. Collins v. Benbury, 27 N.C. 118, 124 (1844); Nash v. Drisco, 51 Me. 417, 418
(1864).
40. Union Trust Co. v. Shelby Downard Asphalt Co., 156 P. 903, 906 (Okla. 1916)
(citing Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Lindsay Bridge Co., 32 OkI. 31, 121 Pac. 639 (1912)); see
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Thus, extrinsic evidence was frequently relied on and the PMR
was not strictly followed.41
The mid to late 1900s also viewed the PMR with disfavor. For
example, the rule was strictly rejected when the California Supreme
Court held that the exclusion of extrinsic evidence "attaches a meaning
to disputed contractual language in accordance with the judge's own
'linguistic education and expenence."'42 Moreover, it held that
adhering to the rule would "presuppose a degree of verbal precision
and stability our language has not attained . . . [and] the proper test of
admissibility of extrinsic evidence to aid in contractual interpretation
is .. . whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to
which the language is reasonably susceptible." 4 3
Despite its history of disfavor, the PMR resurfaced in a number
of Federal Circuit cases since the late 1980s, and the trend now is for
federal courts to adhere to it.44 Several construction-related cases
ushered in this latest era favoring the PMR. An important precedent
was the Hyman Construction case in 1987.45 Several similar cases
followed suit, and in the 1996 McAbee Construction case, the rule was
expanded to include an even stricter interpretation that applied the
PMR to even ambiguous terms.46 A recent Federal Circuit victory in
the resurgent trend of the PMR is Coast Federal, applying the PMR in
the context of Government contracting.
47
also Kavanaugh v. Cohoes Power & Light Co., 187 N.Y.S 216, 227 (1921); Jacobs v.
Teachout, 219 P. 38, 40 (Wash. 1923).
41. American Ins. Co. v. Damascus Lumber Co., Inc., 124 S.E. 269, 270 (Va. 1924).
42. Snow, supra note 5, at 690; see also Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas
Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 37 (1968).
43. Snow, supra note 5, at 690. Pacific Gas in establishing the principle that "evidence
of an extrinsic agreement or understanding . .. can be admitted to assist in the interpretation of
a written contract . . . [if] the evidence is being offered to prove a meaning to which the
language of the writing is reasonably susceptible . . . [allows for] more frequent use of
extrinsic evidence to explain the intended meaning of contract terms . . . [and] avoids the
necessity of finding 'ambiguity'[.]" CLAUDE D. ROHWER & ANTHONY M. SKROCKI,
CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL 235 (7th ed. 2010).
44. Johnson, supra note 3, at 671.
45. George Hyman Constr. Co. v. United States, 832 F.2d 580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In
Hyman, the court refused to apply the custom and trade meaning of the term "heavy duty
auger" and instead applied what it thought was the literal and plain meaning. Id.
46. McAbee Constr. Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1434-36 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
47. Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 323 F.3d 1035, 1038, 1040-41 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (en banc).
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III. COAST FEDERAL AND THE PLAIN MEANING RULE
In 2003, the final decision in Coast Federal Bank FSB v.
United States solidified the prominence of the PMR in the Federal
Circuit and established its application to government contracts. The
history of this case evidences the dissention associated with the use of
the PMR.
In Coast Federal, a dispute arose from an Assistance
Agreement (the "Agreement" or "Contract") between Coast Federal
Bank, FSB ("Coast") and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (the "Government" or "Bank Board"). Coast ageed to
acquire a failed thrift with net liabilities of $347 million.4 As an
incentive to enter into this agreement, the Government made a $299
million cash contribution to Coast to be treated as a credit to Coast's
regulatory capital.50 The Government also agreed to an accounting
forbearance from generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP")
regarding the $299 million contribution.5' The relevant language of the
Contract containing the forbearance can be found at §6(a)(1)(c) of the
agreement:
For purposes of reports to the [Government] other than
reports or financial statements that are required to be
governed by generally accepted accounting principles,
the cash contribution made under this § 6(a) (1) shall be
credited to [Coast's] net worth account and shall
constitute regulatory capital. It is understood by the
parties that the preceding sentence is not intended to
address in any way the accounting treatment of
contributions from [the Government] that must be
reflected in any filing that [Coast] may make, whether
to the Bank Board or otherwise, that requires the
submission of financial statements prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles.52
48. 323 F.3d 1035, 1038, 1040-41 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
49. Id. at 1037.
50. Id.
51. Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 48 Fed. C1. 402, 410 (2000), rev'd, 309 F.3d
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 320 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
aff'd, 323 F.3d 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
52. Coast Fed. Bank, 323 F.3d at 1037 (emphasis added).
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The dispute, however, arose when interpreting §6 of the
Agreement with the "Accounting Principles" clause, which provides,
in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided, any computations made
for purposes of this Agreement shall be governed by
generally accepted accounting principles as applied in
the savings and loan industry, except that where such
principles conflict with the terms of the Agreement,
applicable regulations of the Bank Board or [the
Government], or any resolution or action of the Bank
Board approving or relating to the Acquisition or to this
Agreement, then this Agreement, such regulations, or
such resolution or action shall govern." 53
"Also, §20 of the Agreement provided that "[n]otwithstanding
the foregoing, nothing in this §20 shall affect the first sentence of the
second paragraph in §6(a)(1) of this agreement."54
These terms (Section 6, the Accounting Principles clause, and
Section 20), complete with the "'notwithstandings,' and other cross-
referenced qualifiers, opened the question that had priority: which was
the exception and which was the rule?, 55
In the Court of Federal Claims, Coast contended that the
Agreement provided that the Government's cash contribution for the
acquisition of the failed thrift constituted permanent regulatory capital
which precluded amortization of a corresponding amount of
goodwill.56 The Government argued that the agreement clearly
required the full amount of the contribution to be recognized as
goodwill subject to amortization under GAAP.57 The Court of Federal
Claims, without explicitly stating that it was applying the PMR, ruled
in favor of the Government because "the text of the forbearance
'favors' the Government's interpretation."58 The Court "discounted
and distinguished extrinsic evidence that the Board's examiners had
not objected to Coast Federal's annual reports that showed
nonamortization and that the Bank Board Chairman might have agreed
53. Id. (quoting from Agreement § 20 on Accounting Principles).
54. Coast Fed. Bank, 48 Fed. Cl. at 410, (quoting from Agreement §20 on Accounting
Principles).
55. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 666.
56. Coast Fed. Bank, 48 Fed. Cl. at 406.
57. Id.
58. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 667.
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with Coast Federal's interpretation. [Instead,] the Court relied
significantly on a textual examination." 59
In 2002, the Federal Circuit panel reversed the Court of Federal
Claims decision. The panel "looked to extrinsic evidence of the intent
of the parties" to make their decision. . .because "the language of the
three critical provisions of the Agreement [were] ambiguous." 60 In
finding that, "'the testimony in the case [left] no doubt about the intent
of the parties,' [which was] 'a permanent addition to Coast's
regulatory capital in an amount equal to the cash contribution made
under §6(a)(1)(c),"' 6 1 the panel reversed and remanded the Court of
Federal Claims decision. 62
The panel's decision was subsequently vacated and the
Government's petition for a rehearing en banc was granted.63 The en
banc Court ruled differently than the prior courts: "The lower court's
result was affirmed, but not on the same basis that amortization of the
regulatory capital was the 'more realistic' or 'favored'
interpretation." The en banc court determined that, "notwithstanding
the admitted forbearance from GAAP, the disagreement about which
cross-referenced provisions were subordinate, the testimony, and the
somewhat tortured histo 7 of the case, Coast Federal was now ...
governed by" the PMR. Additionally, the en banc court stated that
§20 of the Agreement unambiguously required that computations and
filings be made in accordance with GAAP. 66 Concluding its opinion,
the en banc court stated that "[w]hen the contractual language is
unambiguous on its face, our inquiry ends and the plain language of
the Agreement controls." 67 Thus, it was firmly established that the
PMR governs the interpretation of government contracts in the Federal
Circuit.
5 9. Id.
60. Id. at 668 (citing Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 309 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)).
61. Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 309 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
62. Id at 1361.
63. Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 320 F.3d 1338, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
64. Johnson, supra note 3, at 670.
65. Id.
66. Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 323 F.3d 1035, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en
banc).
67. Id. at 1040-41.
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IV. "YEA" AND "NAY" TO THE PLAIN MEANING RULE
There are many arguments for and against the usage of the
PMR as an interpretive measure for government and private sector
contracts. Supporters of the PMR argue that using extrinsic evidence
would allow for "ad hoc" and "undocumented understandings" which
are "insufficient for protection of the government. . ."68 Supporters
also say there is a "certainty of the writing" that is not present when
extrinsic evidence of party's intent is introduced. 69 Additionally,
supporters argue that the "writing must be understood by third
parties,"70 and an interpretation based on the plain meaning rather than
using extrinsic evidence ensures that outcome.
Critics of the PMR say that the use of extrinsic evidence serves
to "carry out the understanding of the parties rather than to impose
obligations on them which would be contrary to their
understanding." 71 Critics also argue that "meaning can almost never be
plain except in context" so the "consideration of the circumstances" is
necessary. Finally, the argument has been made that the definition of
"'interpretation' is the 'ascertainment of. . . meaning' and the meaning
sought is that of the parties, either mutually or separately." 73
Ironically, both the critics and the supporters argue that "a
court cannot make a contract for the parties."7 The supporters of the
PMR say that parties should be bound by the lanfuage of a contract
that a court has deemed to be "plain and clear." Otherwise, if the
court used extrinsic evidence to determine what the parties intended,
the court would essentially be "mak[ing]" the contract that the parties
should have made originally, thus making a contract for the parties.76
Critics of the PMR use the same statement to argue that if the parties
have attached a meaning different from which an ordinary person
would believe the language to mean, the court would be "making a
contract for the parties." Thus, the court would be binding them to
68. Johnson, supra note 3, at 671.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 672.
71. Id. at 637.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §212, cmt. a, b (1981).
73. Johnson, supra note 3, at 636.
74. Id. at 638.
75. Id.
76. See Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 323 F.3d 1035, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(en banc); see also George Hyman Constr. Co. v. United States, 832 F.2d 574, 581 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
77. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 638.
2011] 51
52 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 11:1
what the ordinary person (the judge) has deemed the language to
mean, instead of what the parties actually meant. 78
Arguments on both sides are not limited to the contractual
context, one commentator notes similar arguments and ironies with
respect to the PMR in the context of interpreting the Federal Rules of
Evidence and other legal language:
In a textualist approach, one interprets a legal text
simply by resorting to its 'plain meaning.' A delightful
irony is that there is no plain meaning to the 'plain
meaning rule' or 'textualism.'. . .Several arguments
support applying the plain meaning of a statutory
provision.... First, respecting the plain or ordinary
meaning of a legal text gives effect to the expectations
and understanding of those citizens or officials who
must follow or administer the legislation. Second, by
enforcing the "ordinary" community's linguistic
choices, the plain meaning rule serves coordinating and
stabilizing functions, preventing the substitution of
idiosyncratic and contingent choices by individual
judges. Third, the text is said to be the most reliable
evidence of the intent of all of the participants in the
legislative process. . . Fourth, textualism narrows the
scope of government action, allowing more opportunity
for private ordering, and is thus 'consistent with the
liberal principles underlying our political order.'
Finally, limiting interpretation to plain meaning
prevents a judge from grafting her own values onto the
legal text, substituting her views for those of the
democratically elected legislature and Executive. 79
The commentator goes on to provide some of the arguments
against PMR:
The arguments against the plain meaning approach are
similarly powerful. First, there is the realist and post-
modern critique that words simply do not have plain
meaning.... [TIerms are often susceptible of multiple
definitions [as] the meaning of a term is influenced by
its context[,] and [] an interpretation of the 'plain
78. Id.
79. Scallen, supra note, 5 at 1745-46.
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meaning' of a word will not be objective (its central
virtue) because 'the interpreter's perspective will
always interact with the text and historical context.' At
the other side of the political perspective, even Judge
Frank Easterbrook argues that, while a moderate
textualist position is defensible, the strict 'plain
meaning' rationale is not: Plain meaning as a way to
understand language is silly. In interesting cases,
meaning is not 'plain'; it must be imputed; and the
choice among meanings must have a footing more solid
that [sic] a dictionary-which is a museum of words, an
historical catalog rather than a means to decode the
work of the legislature.
Second, courts have been accused of selective
application of the plain meaning rule, resulting in
uncertainty and unpredictability rather than stability.
Third, the plain meaning rule can produce harsh results,
unexpected by the drafters of the legislation. And, in
the case of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the rule 'will
take away much of evidence law's dynamic quality,
forcing courts to decide cases without considering
evidentiary policy.'8 0
The PMR has generated much controversy and passion from
both its proponents and critics. Yet, prior to this article no one has
considered the factor of the RE in settling this long-running PMR
debate.
V. CONSIDERATIONS IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PMR AND RE
A. The PMR Resurfaces Because it Must
The current resurgence the PMR is enjoying was inevitable
because it is more consistent with Euro-American cultural traits,
specifically the RE, than the usage of extrinsic evidence. Often,
institutions in a given society reflect and support that society's culture,
and the judicial system is no exception. Within a given institution, the
rules and operations reflect and support the ideas of the institution.
Given the dichotomous choice between the PMR and usage of
80. Id. at 1746-47.
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extrinsic evidence, the PMR is more reflective and supportive of the
judicial system itself, and; accordingly, Euro-American culture.
First, the judge uses the PMR to objectively ascertain meaning
by examining only the relevant document and ultimately makes a
determination that he or she finds acceptable, although not necessarily
what the parties intended. This assures, inter alia, that Euro-American
cultural norms (specifically the RE) as embodied by the judge
ultimately decide the outcome-not justice.81 In addition, it propagates
the RE as potential future litigants alter their conduct in response to
such judicial decisions.
Second, the PMR supports hierarchical relationships and
standardization to a greater degree than extrinsic evidence. Both of
these traits are of high value in Euro-American culture. As
commentators have noted, a classic example of the value of
hierarchical relationships in western society is embodied by the
Descartes mind over body or reason over emotion split of the self and
subsequent hierarchical ordering.82 Legal Feminist theorists readily
recognize the highly valued hierarchical ordering of male over female
in western society. As Dr. Ani notes, this valuing of hierarchies (and
standardization) "allows for control" and ultimately provides
"effective ideological underpinning for politically and culturally
aggressive and imperialistic behavior patterns on the part of European
people[.]" 83
Third, the RE itself "is designed to create an image that will
prevent others from successfully anticipating European behavior, and
its objective is to encourage nonstrategic (i.e. naYve, rather than
successful) political behavior on the part of others." 84 The PMR allows
judges to advance their own "image," without deference to the parties'
intent. Judges in applying the PMR propagate an image of themselves
as being impartial, objective, or fair as they are merely applying the
plain meaning to a particular term or phrase at issue. A plain meaning
ostensibly derived from an outside independent source. The degree of
the judiciary's success in projecting this image bolsters the likelihood
of future parties' reliance upon the judiciary. Even the PMR's
potential for disregard of one or more of the parties' intent does not
8 1. Judges as privileged members of the upper-class have substantial interests in
promoting Euro-American cultural norms as their privileged position is derived from those
norms, societies, and systems. Theresa M. Beiner, How the Contentious Nature of Federal
Judicial Appointments Affects "Diversity" on the Bench, 39 U. RICH. L. R~v. 849, 864-64
(2005).
82. ANI, supra note 2, at 31, 32, 45.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 316.
ANGLO-AMERICAN RHETORICAL ETHIC
defeat this dynamic. Like the RE, the PMR "'packages European
cultural imperialism in a wrapping that makes it appear more attractive
and less harmful. None of these features represents what can culturally
be referred to as an "ideal" in any sense."85
Thus, these factors enable the PMR to resurface even after
periods of disfavor and apparent defeat. 86 Moreover, because Euro-
American culture is so deeply imbued with the RE, the PMR will not
be totally defeated even though judges periodically state that the strict
plain meaning rational is asinine: "Plain meaning as a way to
understand language is silly." 87
B. The Holy Trinity: PMR, "Reasonable Man, " and Hypocrisy
The reasonable man standard is always in play when the court
deploys the PMR. When a court employs the PMR and decides that the
meaning of the plain and unambiguous language will be exclusively
determined at face value from the four corners of the document, it does
so "objectively,,88 as a "reasonable man." Also, when a court decides
there is ambiguity in the disputed language of a contract and examines
the plain meaning of the contract, it looks to what that language would
mean to the "reasonable man."
Many insightful legal scholars have correctly noted that the
reasonable man standard is in fact the white male standard: "[T]he
'reasonable [man]' is understood ... to be white, male, heterosexual,
able-bodied, and class privileged." 89 Most courts have made a largely
cosmetic change in the doctrinal standard from 'reasonable man' to
'reasonable person.' 90 The white race as the norm, the unspoken
85. Id.
86. The factors provided are not necessarily the universe of supportive factors, however,
they are among the most salient.
87. Scallen, supra note 5, at 1787.
88. Some have noted that objectivity itself is a cover in Euro-American societies since
"[o]bjectivity is dominant culture subjectivity." Wekesa 0. Madzimoyo, Instructor, Lecture at
AYA Educ. Inst. (Winter, 2003) (quoting Dr. Valerie Batts, PhD., Executive Director,
VISIONS, Inc., Consulting and Training in Diversity & Inclusion).
89. "[T]he 'reasonable [man]' is understood . . . to be white, male, heterosexual, able-
bodied, and class privileged." Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and
White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269,
297(1994); see, e.g., McGee v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 953 F.2d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir.
1992) (construing a health-care agreement by "giving the language its common and ordinary
meaning as a reasonable person in the position of the HMO participant, not the actual
participant, would have understood the words"); see also Enercomp, Inc. v. McCorhill Publ'g,
Inc., 873 F.2d 536, 548-49 (2d Cir. 1989).
90. Id.
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standard of objectivity, and the basis for judicial decisions is
unfortunately pervasive:
. . . Race functions as an unspoken rationale in legal
doctrine in the United States. The persuasive force of
race is used to support doctrinal rules and principles
that, in turn, structure legal argument and decision. . .
By featuring the understandings and expectations of
privileged white men as the standard for contract
interpretation, the objective theory establishes and
maintains a white, class-privileged, male norm as the
governing law of contractual obligation. And, by
treating that standard as "normal" and "reasonable," the
objective theory treats anyone who has a different
understanding or expectation as defective-ill-informed,
lacking education and skill, or unreliable. It maintains
hierarchies of race, class, and gender, while allowing
people to believe that the law is not racist, class-biased,
or sexist.91
The incorporation of the norms and values of white males, or
Euro-American culture necessarily includes the RE. The incorporation
of the RE necessarily includes hypocrisy. 92 Hypocrisy as a way of life
is a major tenant of Caucasian life, values and norms: "[h]ypocritical
behavior is sanctioned and rewarded in European culture. The
rhetorical ethic helps to sanction it." 93 The PMR's incorporation of the
"reasonable man" standard provides a doorway for the RE and
hypocrisy to operate in judicial decision making. Hypocrisy should be
anathema to a system of justice.
C. Solution: Using Extrinsic Evidence
The allowance of extrinsic evidence to resolve contract
interpretation disputes provides a way out of the morass of hypocrisy
that the PMR engenders. For example, if the court in Coast Federal
had allowed extrinsic evidence, then the agreement that the court
actually enforced would have been consistent with the parties' actual
intentions at the time of contracting. In other words, Coast would have
been allowed to deviate from GAAP principles in return for taking on
91. Kastely, supra note 89, at 293-94.
92. Id
93. ANI, supra note 2, at 315.
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the liabilities of a failed institution since the assumption of the
liabilities was an undesirable task the Government contracted to avoid.
Instead, because the en banc court precluded extrinsic evidence, the
court rendered the intent of both parties null.94 The en banc holding
provides a typical example of injustice as judges draft and enforce a
"new" contract; a new contract that the parties themselves never
intended.95 Thus, the judicial system opens itself up frequently to the
critique of the judicial system substituting its intent for the parties.'
The PMR proved unfairly prejudicial to Coast Federal, as the
court's decision rendered Coast contractually bound to a payment
system Coast Federal neither bargained for nor agreed to.9 6 The
Federal Circuit panel's use of extrinsic evidence led to the discovery
that Coast's negotiator, its CEO and its Chairman specifically
bargained for and understood that the contract "did clearly provide that
Coast would receive a permanent addition to Coast's regulatory
capital in an amount equal to the cash contribution made under §
6(a)(1)(C)."97 The focus of the acquisition was "a crucial incentive to
get Coast to rescue the failing Central with $347 million in net
liabilities." 98 The panel also importantly noted "absent thrifts like
Coast, federal agencies would have to take over all the failing thrifts
themselves and pay depositors who had lost their savings." 99 Thus, the
use of extrinsic evidence not only adequately reveals the proper
bargained for exchange, but it enables the Courts to prevent injustice
that may lead to deleterious consequences down the road.
CONCLUSION
If justice is the end, hypocrisy has no place. The RE is a
vehicle for the injection of the hypocrisy that courses through the veins
of Euro-American culture. Therefore it would behoove a system of
justice to remove or at least minimize hypocrisy by shifting to a more
expansive usage of extrinsic evidence than the application of the PMR
would allow.
94. Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 323 F.3d 1038, 1040-41 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(en banc).
95. Id. at 1038.
96. Id at 1040.
97. Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 309 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1356.
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